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Abstract
There is a natural tension between the effects on public opinion of social networks
and the news media. It is widely believed that social networks tend to harmonize opinions
within them, but the presence of media may accentuate diversity by inserting discordant
messages. On the other hand, in a totalitarian state where the government controls the
media, social networks may mitigate the homogenizing pressure of a regime’s
propaganda. The tendency of opinion to follow the “official line” may be mitigated
because opponents of the government interact on a personal level and bolster one
another’s views.
This paper employs agent-based modeling—an approach that allows researchers
to observe preference change the individual, social network, and the society levels—to
explore conditions under which social networks and news media influence citizens’
preferences. Citizen agents are embedded within networks of interpersonal
communication and can be by influenced by widely disseminated news media. Situations
such as the one where there are no news media, one with polarized news media, and one
where there is only a monolithic (state controlled) media that broadcasts a single,
consistent message. We also explore the role of selective perception in these conditions.
The results indicate that the overall impact of news media is contingent on the variety of
preferences news media provide as well as on the willingness of agents to accept media
messages at face value.
Keywords: communication networks, preference, diversity, media, selective perception,
agent-based modeling
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Introduction
Many students of political communication have contended that communication
networks tend to homogenize preferences of their members. The longstanding view had
been that social networks are almost completely homogeneous, rendering interpersonal
communication a somewhat hollow exercise in re-affirmation of shared opinions
(Axelrod, 1997; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1968). That extreme view has been
somewhat muted by recent work, but there is still a general tendency to believe that
opinion networks collect together like-minded people and encourage conformity (Mutz &
Martin, 2001). Some recent empirical research indicates that there are higher-thanexpected levels of preference diversity among people who regularly interact (Baker,
Ames, & Renno, 2006; Feldman & Price, 2008; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2002;
Zuckerman, Kotler-Berkowitz, & Swaine, 1998), causing a re-formulation of our theories
about the role of social networks in opinion formation.
There is an emerging consensus for the view that individual opinions reflect a
complicated mixture of influences, including interpersonal interactions over a period of
time and ideas and messages gathered from the news media. Whereas individual
interactions are, by definition, confined to the small spaces of social networks, the
distinguishing characteristic of news media is that a single message may be consumed by
many people simultaneously. One might suppose that news media will tend to wield an
enormous impact on opinion, but there are several personal and social network attributes
that may mitigate media impact . The primary personal elements that mitigate media
impact include the tendency of some to ignore the news media altogether, the ability to
discount media messages that contradict long-term personal experience, and the ability to
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sort through media and particular messages to find components that support existing
opinions. Equally important, however, there are the mitigating elements in social
networks. Media messages may have “shock value” that impacts public opinion over the
short term, but social interaction can often remind people of their long standing opinions
and bolster people who are “on the verge” of changing their minds (Huckfeldt, et al.,
2002; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004).
The complexity of this process, involving variables at the individual, group, and
social levels, makes the assessment of media impact a difficult task for empirical research.
One may predict that a democracy where the news media are polarized and all citizens
sometime perform selective perception—interpreting received messages in a way that
make their values or stances consistent with those that held in mind—will grow more
polarized and that preference diversity that an individual could perceive within his or her
community will decrease. This validity of scenario may be sound but it is very difficult to
examine with an empirical approach (Shibanai, Yasuno, & Ishiguro, 2001). Is the
existence of the polarized news media environment detrimental to the cultivation of a
heterogeneous environment where individuals perceive a great level of preference
diversity to make fair choices about an issue or a candidate? And, to what extent does
selective perception performed by the audience influences this process? To understand
the effect of polarized media sources on a controversial issue, one needs to contract a
system with multiple news sources against a system of no news media and a system
where there is only one news source. Agent-based modeling (ABM) renders a way to
answer (a) how interacting with the news media and communication networks and (b)
how performing selective perception affect preference diversity.
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The Interplay of Communication Networks and the News Media
The view that social networks are homogeneous and self-reinforcing traces back
to the early research on public opinion that is known as the Columbia School (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1968). The
view that people are inclined to talk to like-minded others and vote for a candidate that is
supported by the majority of the group members has inspired much follow-up research in
the United States (Beck, 1991; Mutz, 2001; Scherer & Cho, 2003) and Great Britain
(Pattie & Johnston, 2001). Perhaps the original contention that social networks are
homogeneous was an over-exaggeration, but there is nonetheless a considerable amount
of truth and an increasing number of evidence showing that networks tend to exert a
homogenizing influence.
The empirical research suggests that the homogenizing influence of social
networks often stops short of eliminating preference diversity. Instead, there are several
factors that sustain preference diversity within networks. People who are in the minority
in one social context are often able to find people of similar perspective in other contexts.
Interaction with self-selected network members, especially when new information is
obtained from trustworthy others, may cause opinion change, but it can also bolster
existing opinions (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998).
Social networks tend to be highly idiosyncratic and non-overlapping. It is not typically
the case that people who talk to each other form a closed circle that excludes all others.
Rather, it is more likely the case that each individual person constructs a list of
discussants, and the lists held by several people who interact do not coincide to a large
degree. In other words, even if two people interact with each other, it is not likely that
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they share the same discussants. As a result, people who hold views that are unpopular in
one setting sometimes find support from other members of their personal networks who
hold similarly unpopular views (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt, 2002; Huckfeldt, et
al., 2002). There is also evidence for the view that individuals are not necessarily adverse
to political disagreement. People seem to seek out others that they consider to be
experts—those with greater level of political knowledge—even though they do not agree
with those experts (Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996; Miller & Krosnick, 2000).
On the surface, it seems as though the news media might exert a powerful
homogenizing force on public opinion because a single message is disseminated across
society, touching individuals across a variety of social networks. Early research which
sought to quantify the impact of the media left researchers disappointed because the
impact seemed to be rather “minimal” (Bartels, 1993; Converse, 1964).
Recent findings point out that the influence of the news media on the public is
conditional. Psychological mechanisms such as selective exposure, selective perception,
and selective retention (Klapper, 1960; Mutz, 1998) may be a part of the explanation for
the minimal effects. People that coincide with their current views (Mutz & Martin, 2001).
The “uses and gratification theory” emphasizes that individuals use the media to
strengthen their existing preferences (McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002; Rubin, 2002).
When discordant media messages arise, people use their current beliefs to judge the
credibility of a media source and often misremember messages that run counter to their
pre-existing beliefs (Oliver, 2002). Where news sources, such as radio talk shows, take a
one-sided approach to a controversial issue, the mechanism of selective perception drives
individuals to be more radical in their preferences (R. Lance Holbert, 2004; Jones, 2002).
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Built upon these empirical findings, this study attempts to assess the extent to
which the news media and social networks homogenize the public and the extent to
which selective processes (particularly selective perception) aggravate (or mitigate) the
consequence of homogenization of preferences.
The resurgent debate on the “minimal effects” (see, Robert Lance Holbert, Garrett,
& Gleason, 2010) should not lead to the conclusion that the news media are unimportant,
any more than the Columbia School findings indicate that social networks are irrelevant.
Rather, both sets of findings point to the fact that individual opinions reflect a
complicated mixture of personal experience, interpersonal communication, and exposure
to the news media. Theories and empirical findings in this field suggest that the media
message can bolster an individual’s opinion, and if that individual is in the minority
within a given family or workplace, then the media play an important role in mitigating
the homogenizing pressure of interpersonal interaction. The media may not have the
impact of observably changing an opinion, but it is important nonetheless. The problem is
that it remains difficult to observe the subtle influence of news media on the dynamics of
the formation of preference at the individual and the aggregate levels.
When one tries to study the role of the news media and social network’s influence,
it is also important to acknowledge the fact that individuals differ in the way they interact
with information sources, such as the frequency of accessing the news media,
involvement in political discussion, and the likelihood of performing selective perception.
A finding that political knowledge facilitates the process of incorporating new policyspecific information into political judgments (Gilens, 2001), which confirms a classic
distinction between the politically aware and the politically less aware (Converse, 1964;
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Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005), further suggests that there exists a certain proportion of
individuals that are more capable of processing political news and making sense of the
pieces of information than the politically unaware majority. Because party identification
and the media news consumption reinforce each other, the politically aware will be more
able to resist information from the news media.
In sum, the literature suggests that preference diversity survives when social
support is available within one’s communication networks. Unfortunately, empirical
studies that attempt to distinguish media effects from communication networks is not
entirely satisfying. As Mutz (1998) contends, the influence of personal interaction on
opinion is implicit (See also, Shane, 2001). Huckfeldt et. al (2004) also suggest that,
because network effects are dynamic and subtle, it may be that empirical research will
not resolve the problem to the satisfaction of all. Moreover, although the literature has
identify the existence of selective perception, the role of this mechanism in aggravating
or mitigating social polarization remains unclear.
In this article, we intend to show that it is possible to use a series of computational
simulation to make some headway on a theoretical level (Gonzalez-Avella et al., 2006;
Shibanai, et al., 2001). Taking into account the insights gained from previous empirical
research, we propose a self-organizing computer program that take into account the
nature of communication networks and important factors of information processing.

Previous Models of Opinion Dynamics
Students of public opinion were among the first social scientists to introduce
agent-based models. Many of the core ideas of simple cellular automata found direct
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applications to opinion models that represented spatially-arrayed agents colored squares
in a grid of cells. The social impact model (Latane, 1981; Latane & Nowak, 1997; Latane,
Nowak, & Liu, 1994; Andrzej Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990), a leading application of
the cellular automata, describes a situation in which each agent is simultaneously
pressured by all of the rest. Agents that are close together exert a stronger influence on
each other than agents who are far apart, and cells change value when the pressure in
favor of change exceeds the pressure opposed to it.
One of the major shortcomings of the social impact model is that it does not
describe inter-agent communications in any detail. The distance-based formula for social
pressure is assumed, rather than derived within the framework of the model. The agents
do not interact on a one-to-one basis. That is certainly not the case in other early opinion
models, where individual interactions are allowed and they drive the development of the
system. Building on Carley (1991), Axelrod’s (1997) highly influential “culture model”
(referred to as the ACM) described agents on a grid who select each other for interactions
and copy traits from one another. Although it has not always been clear in discussions of
the ACM, that model always evolves into a social system evolves into rigidly separated
blocks, where the agents within each block are completely identical and agents from
neighboring blocks are completely different from each other (Huckfeldt, et al., 2004). In
many simulations, the end result is a homogeneous society.
The ACM has been the basic framework in which many variations have been
considered. The arguments offered, however, should be qualified in light of the fact that
the ACM tends to homogenize the society, so changes that are introduced have to be
interpreted in that light. Two projects have introduced mass communication elements in
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the reconsideration of the ACM. Shibanai et al. (2001) provide agents with a globally
accessible information source—the news media—that informs them about the state of the
society. When a plural information mechanism is assumed, global information distributed
through the news media may maintain local diversity.1
Also from a physicist’s perspective, Galam (1997) presents a grid-based model to
represent agents who make “yes” or “no” decisions. Preference diversity may emerge
when the model introduces individual differences, such as “cultural values, past
experiences, ethics and beliefs.” The author claims that individuality is “a necessary
ingredient to both weaken extreme option and oppose an external social pressure” (p.79).
The introduction of agents that are impervious to social interaction may prevent the
homogenization of opinion, but we doubt that it is a necessary component. Quite the
contrary, a richer model of information evaluation seems to both prevent the
homogenization of opinion and generate a more empirically accurate prediction about
opinion dynamics. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) develop a model in which
agents accumulate opinions from various agents and then adopt new views when there is
substantial support for those views in their personal networks. Galam (2005a, 2005b)
proposes a similar strategy, one in which agents respond to pressure from their neighbors
only when certain supports for the current point of view are lacking. Galam (Galam,
2005a) suggests, as do Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, that the extension of the model
to include media effects would be quite welcome.
1

Using the terminology of statistical physics, Gonzalez-Avella et al. (2006) represent the ACM as an Ising
spin glass and introduce message sources that are available across several cells. When the individual
probability of accessing the news media is sufficiently large, the news media will contribute to cultural
diversity. The media source, hence, acts as a force that thwarts the homogenizing tendencies of social
networks. The authors note the irony of this finding: the insertion of an effect that is common across cells
tends to diversify the cells. But one should not forget that the result is specific to the ACM, a model that
has a very particular dynamic that does not match our expectations in the study of public opinion.
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Model Design
Following this stream of research, we employ a richer model of social interaction
and then introducing mass media components. Our social network model is based on the
view that persuasive information primarily comes from family and like-minded friends
with whom people interact, but divergent views may be encountered on a regular basis.
We construct an agent-based model to simulate the long-term influence of political
interaction in conjunction with selective perception of media messages.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) has been increasingly widely used in the social
sciences (Axelrod, 1997; Johnson, 1999) and studies of opinion formation have been
widely used (Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Huckfeldt, et al., 2004). The model we used
is S-RAS, built upon John Zaller’s RAS model of opinion formation using Swarm
Simulation libraries ( http://www.swarm.org) (Liu, 2007, 2010). The term agent in this
study refers to citizens who are evaluating information (for example, they might be
thought of as voters during an election campaign). The agents follow behavioral rules and
collect preferences through dyadic interactions. Figure 1 provides a visualized flow chart
that summarizes how agents in this model update their preferences. This figure includes a
number of variables and mechanisms to be detailed below.
Note that the goal of ABM design is not to mirror the real world perfectly, but
create a reasonably realistic framework that characterizes the essential features of the
problem that we are studying. This approach represents self-contained information
processing agents who interact according to a variety of possible behavioral rules. Unlike
reality, which frustrates our efforts to isolate media and network effects, the simulation
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framework offers an opportunity to use an “artificial society” to measure the impact of
hypothesized conditions on phenomena of interest (Epstein & Axtell, 1996).

The Features of Agents
We consider a model in which there is one issue, which might represent the
choice of candidates in an election (Bush or Kerry in the 2004 American presidential
election, for example) or a “Yes” or “No” decision on a referendum. We abstract this by
simply referring to two values, 1 (or “Yes”) and 0 (or “No”). A two valued piece of
information is called a “bit”. At the outset, each agent has randomly assigned opinion,
either 0 or 1. This means that, in each simulation, the initial conditions present us with an
approximately evenly divided society.
Each agent has a “political memory”, a string of bits that represents the agent’s
experience. Each element represents an impression, scored either 0 or 1, to summarize
perceptions about the position of a discussant or the news media. Agents do not keep
comprehensive records on what particular agents “say,” or which agent contributed a
particular opinion. They simply formulate Yes or No impressions and add them onto the
string of bits in memory. This approach has been proposed in several studies (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1981; Zaller, 1992).
The memory strings of the agents can be used to summarize the state of the
society. The memory string of an agent who encounters only “No” opinions would look
like this: (0,0,0,...,0), while that of an agent who encounters only “Yes” would be
(1,1,1,...,1). If a society is composed of agents like that, then we say it is highly polarized,
in the sense that the experiences of randomly drawn agents are likely to be either

12
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity

completely different or exactly the same. On the other hand, in a society where agents
encounter a mixture of opinions, memory strings would have more variety. If we
calculate the average of these bits, we arrive at a numerical index that can be displayed in
the model’s graphical interface.
Every agent is unique and autonomous in its behavior. There are six fixed
parameters that are set for each agent at the beginning of the simulation: party
identification, political expertise, capacity of memory, the probability of discussing
politics, the probability of accessing the news media, and the probability of performing
selective perception (.1 to .9).
In S-RAS, the majority of citizens are ordinary agents, while a small proportion of
them are politically aware, an aspect of design that is consistent with Katz and Lazarsfeld
(1955). A “politically aware” agent is one that has a longer memory (20 bits are
remembered), higher expertise (drawn at random from 6, 7, 8, 9, 10), a higher propensity
to access the news media (equally likely between .6 and .9), and a high propensity to
discuss politics (between .6 and .9). We set that an artificial society is composed of 2% of
such politically aware agents, while the majority of agents have shorter memories (10
bits), lower political expertise (drawn at random from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and lower
probabilities of discussing politics, accessing the media, and exercising selective
perception (all parameters drawn at random from the interval between .1 and .5). By this
design, a politically less aware agent is less likely to initiate a political interaction and is
also less likely to be the target of an interaction initiated by another who is seeking
political expertise.
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Agents who perform selective perception will interpret what they receive from the
news media (either 0 or 1) to be consistent with their belief system. When agents do not
perform selective perception they will ignore messages from the media, or store nothing
in memory, when they access the news media at a given iteration. We assume that the
politically aware, compared to the less politically aware, are more likely to selectively
perceive and reinterpret messages from the news media consistent to their belief system.
Therefore, we set that individual citizen agents favoring 1 (or saying “Yes”) are more
likely to store 1 in memory every time they access the chosen news object; agents
favoring 0 (or saying “No”) are more likely to receive 0 every time they access the news
media. If we take one more step to take into account the mechanism of selective
perception mentioned above, in our model politically aware agents that favor 1 are more
likely to receive 1 every time they access the news media than are the politically unaware
that are also favoring 1. Similarly, for agents favoring 0, the politically aware are more
likely to receive 0 every time it access the news media than are the politically unaware
that are also favoring 0. For example, a politically aware agent is created with the value
of its partisanship set to 1 and the value of selective perception initiated .6. When the
agent accesses its favorite news media (should be the media that favor 1), it will have an
odd .6 to save 1 in its running tally of memory. Four out of ten times when the agent
chooses to access the news source it will not perform selective perception, which means
that it will store neither 0 nor 1 in its running tally. The agents will retain their opinion
unless a substantial amount of evidence accumulates in favor of the other side’s point of
view. Recall that this is a central element in the autoregressive influence model
(Huckfeldt, et al., 2004) and the theory of spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).
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Dyadic Interaction within a Communication Network
All interaction among agents is dyadic in nature. There are no “group
discussions.” Rather, agents search for like-minded others with whom to interact. Agents
look for discussants based on their contact lists where the priority is an agent with a
higher level of political expertise and the same party identification. When an agent finds
an available discussant, both agents will become unavailable to the other agents (See,
Huckfeldt, et al., 1995).
Regarding the design of communication networks and “contact lists,” the agents
are evenly distributed on a 3x3 square grid where every agent is surrounded by eight
possible contacts. Each agent’s political party identification and political expertise is
clearly visible to its contacts. An agent will decide to initiate a political interaction with a
given probability, and then the agent will seek out a discussion partner. Agents can only
initiate discussion with another if that other agent is not already having a discussion with
someone else. The agent’s search process will proceed in two steps. First, the contacts
that share the agent’s political party identification are considered. They are sorted by
political expertise and the available agent with the most expertise is invited to interact.
Party identification is the first criterion of contact selection, while political expertise
comes as the second. The most favorable contacts are those with the same political
identification and of higher political expertise. The less favorable contacts are those with
different party identification but higher political expertise. The least favorable agents are
those with different identification and lower political expertise. The particular contacts
with whom any agent will interact is thus somewhat unpredictable.
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Social interaction is not necessarily based on geographical distance (as would, for
example,Adrzej Nowak, Latane, & Lewenstein, 1994). Hence, a reader is suggested to
view that the eight possible contacts can be located in a diverse set of geographical
positions but remain connected with an agent. For example, Mary has forms her circle of
political discussants, composed of her parents living together, her boyfriend that lives in
another town, two close friends in her “American politics” class, and three other friends
online. To Mary, this circle of eight contacts is real and they are not necessarily live close
to her, and anyone of her contact list has his or her own contact list where Mary may or
may not be listed.

Integration of News Media
We construct the news media object as an object, external to an agent’s
communication network, that broadcasts “the sequence of the most preferred features, to
be referred by the target agents equally,” (Shibanai, et al., 2001, p. 84) such as
“advertising or propaganda being imposed by controlled media on all elements of a social
system” (Gonzalez-Avella, et al., 2006, p. 46119). Unlike communication networks
where an individual interacts with limited number of people, a news media object can be
seen as any source of information other than dyadic interpersonal discussion. Because by
design every agent will have an equal opportunity to access self-selected news media
objects and because the news media object is subjectively chosen, an agent will receive
preferences that are consistent with the agent’s belief system. Similar to what Shibanai et
al. (2001) describe in their first experiment, news media objects we described above can
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be seen as the 9th network member (in addition to the 8 self-selected discussants in a
Moore neighborhood) of an agent and the top of the agent’s contact list.
Salient issues, especially controversial ones, such as abortion, gay rights, and tax
cut, usually lead to polarization in the public. The attitudes of the news media regarding
these issues—supporting or opposing an issue, or holding conservative or liberal tone
about the issue˜ are usually explicitly and implicitly revealed in their programs, the
choice of sound bites or events, talk shows, etc (Iyengar & Hahn, 2007). To be consistent
with this empirical pattern, we construct two news media objects in our model indicating
two streams of “global information,” each of which can be understood as a TV channel, a
newspaper, a radio program, a magazine, or a news website on the Internet. These
characteristics of the news media in our model, therefore, lie in the assumption
performing selective perception is a matter of degree when individuals access the news
media.

The Experiment Design
Given a model of artificial society described above, we use five sets of parameter
values to explore (1) the extent to which the influence of media use differs from the
influence of communication networks and (2) the influence of selective perception on
preserving preference diversity within communication networks.
Other things being equal, Experiment 1 (No Media) has no news media object
(the value for the parameter numMedia is set to 0) so that interaction with their
communication networks is the only way in which agents obtain political information.
Experiment 2 (Two Media Objects & Agents Performing Selective Perception) has two
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news media objects, one favoring 1 and the other favoring 0 (the value for the parameter
numMedia is set to 2). and allows all agents to perform selective perception. Experiment
3 (Two Media Objects & Agents Performing No Selective Perception) keeps the setting
of Set 2 but turns off the mechanism of selective perception.
Initial conditions are controlled so that the i’th run of each model is confronted
with an identical set of initial conditions. As a result, any differences observed across the
models on the i’th run are solely due to differences in the behavioral rules that are
employed. Hence, it will be meaningful to make some fine-grained comparisons across
the simulation results. With these first three experiments, net effect of communication
networks can be shown through a comparison the results of Experiment 1 and the results
of Experiments 2 and 3. We will also see the net effect of selective perception mechanism
by comparing the results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.
Next, in Experiments 4 (One Media Object and Agents Performing Selective
Perception) and 5 (One Media Object & Agents Performing No Selective Perception) we
replicate Experiments 2 and 3 except that we reset parameter values of numMedia to 1.
The monotone news media object consistently favors 0 or “No”.
We have collected batches of 100 runs for each of the 5 experiments. The
simulation begins with randomly assigned conditions, such as the location of the two
classes of agents, and stops when opinion patterns appear to have stabilized (20 passes
are made through the list of agents without any preference change), or when the number
of passes exceeds 900.
The starting points for each run within each batch are equivalent. That is to say, in
the first run of each experiment, the same set of parameter values, such as information

18
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity

about voter preferences, party identification, and expertise is used. Each run for each
experiment begins with approximately half (recall preferences are assigned randomly) of
the 16,000 agents (including the two classes of the agents—the politically aware that
account for 2% of the population and the less politically aware that account for the rest
98%) holding preference “1” and the other half holding “0.” The aggregate indicators are:
1. The proportion of agents who hold vote preference 1 or “Yes.” This indicator will
suggest if the distribution of political preference will change over time.
2. The level of perceived diversity—a summary of the homogeneity of the agent
environments. Agent experiences diversity if it has 2 or more opposing opinions
in its memory at a given time. The aggregate indicator represents the proportion
of agents who experience diversity.
Having simulation run forever does not help understanding the dynamics of a shortterm campaign period. Moreover, although 900 is an arbitrary number used to stop
simulation, we found that the patterns of simulation exceeding 900 are not much different
from those found at this time step.

Simulation Results
The series of simulation lead to two major findings. First, an artificial society in
which agents access no news media or a monotone medium will form identifiable
preference clusters. Second, the effect of selective perception is contingent upon the
media environment. In the artificial society in the present study where the news sources
are polarized we find that selective perception helps preserve preference diversity at the
communication network level (Experiment 1). In an artificial society where agents access
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only one news source, however, selective perception demolishes such diversity
(Experiment 4).
First, the small standard deviations across the board suggest that every experiment
has small variance across their 100 runs. Each run of the model (i.e. from the time step 0
to the time step 900) is initiated with a different random seed, so the time-trajectories of
the artificial societies are unique. Nevertheless, the small standard deviations indicate that
the patterns emerging from simulations will be insensitive to random variation in initial
conditions.
Second, consider the maintenance of diversity over time. The initial conditions
have approximately 50 percent of agents holding the preference 1 or “Yes” and the rest
favoring 0 or “No.” It is interesting to find that the proportion of agents supporting “Yes”
is quite similar in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5. As a clear contrast to the first three
experiments, this proportion drops in Experiment 4 (.007). This finding suggests that, if
the public is polarized between “Yes” and “No,” the status of polarization is very likely
to continue unless there is change in the news media environment, such as all news media
take the same side of the issue (in the case of this paper, the media turn to support “No”).
The row of “Perceived Diversity” in Table 1 reports the means of the proportion
of agents perceiving preference diversity. The initial proportion of agents perceiving
preference diversity is .5. Table 1 shows dramatic drop in Diversity across the five
experiments: .214, .232, .335, .009, and .232, respectively.
The decline in Diversity suggests the formation of homogeneous networks. When
the simulations end, agents reporting that they perceive preference diversity are those
who reside in the “edge” of homogeneous networks. This proportion for Experiment 4
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is .009, suggesting that there are only about 14 agents (out of 1,600) perceiving diversity.
The small amount of diversity survives is found in the form of opinion clusters. By
design, only homogeneous networks of members of the minority prevent their members
from being conformed to the majority preference.
A closer comparison across the five experiments suggests the following. First, the
almost identical pattern of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 suggests that, given two news
media sources, the politically aware, by design, account for only 2% of the population
have little leverage to change the pattern and that selective perception has a weak
relationship with the proportion of agents perceiving diversity.
A further comparison between Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 suggests a distinct
role of selective perception in the condition of monotone media source. As Experiment 4
shows, the single source of news media broadcasting 0 or “No” successfully reshapes and
homogenizes the public's preference (the proportion of agents supporting “Yes” dropped
to 0.7 percent). If agents, particularly the politically aware, stop performing selective
perception but start to ignore messages from the news source, the proportion of agents
perceiving diversity will increases to the level of Experiments 1, 2, and 3.

Visualized Patterns
The pictures shown in Figure 2 confirm those derived from Table 1 and provide
more information about the influence of the number of media sources and the influence
of selective perception on the distribution of disagreement.
The initial condition (the upper left of Figure 2), based on the assumption that
individuals have a preexisting preference guided by their party identification, randomly
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distributed agents holding a preference. About half of the agents hold 1 or “Yes” (white)
and the rest hold 0 or “No” (black). By design, the cells do not simply show voter
preference in white and black but show opinion that varies between 0 and 1. Hence,
Figure 2 better than a figure simply showing agent's voter preference to presents the
distribution of ambivalent agents (in gray). Because individual agents will start to collect
impressions from either the news media or their network members and update their
opinions based on the average of the past preferences, gray cells will emerge when a
simulation starts. Gray cells will indicate the locations of agents experiencing diversity or
ambivalence. These are representative snapshots. Presented pictures are obtained from
the particular runs in which the values being tracked, Opinion YES and Diversity, are
closest to the means of those two variables across the 100 runs (as shown in Table 1).
Specifically, for the 100 simulations of each experiment, Figure 2 presents the 85th run
(seed 3850763) for Experiment 1, the 21st run (seed 908381) for Experiment 2, the 46th
run (seed 2232645) for Experiment 3, the 55th run (seed 2566711) for Experiment 4, and
the 75th run (seed 3396126) for Experiment 5. These run numbers and specific seeds
recorded here will help future researchers to use our model to replicate the presented
results.
The visualized pattern of Experiment 1 shows that interaction with network
members at the local level creates opinion clusters. There is relatively little diversity
found within the clusters, which suggest that these clusters homogenize the preferences
of their members.
The pictures of Experiments 2 and 3 in the middle column of Figure 2 show the
net effect of selective perception. One sees that Experiment 2 has greater variance in
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opinion within communication networks and that Experiment 3 shows clear edges of
opinion clusters (even though the variance of opinion is greater in Experiment 3 than in
Experiment 1. This suggests that, although polarized news sources sustain the
polarization of voter preferences, agents in Experiment 2 perceive greater diversity in
their communication networks than their counterparts in Experiment 3, even though the
averages of the number of agents perceiving diversity in both experiments (as shown in
Table 1) are similar. This pattern implies that in a society with multiple news sources the
mechanism of selective perception at the individual level is likely to contribute to the
survival of preference diversity at the network level. If the individuals in this society turn
to ignore political information about the given issue every time when they access the
news media, the number of individuals perceiving diversity will increases (as the means
in Table 1 suggest), but opinion clusters will grow more homogeneous.
The mechanism of selective perception has a different role when the news media
environment is changed. When all news sources broadcasting the same preference, or
when there is only one news source, it will be difficult to see a balance between the two
vote preferences. Public opinion will be drawn toward the side that the news medium
favors. As Experiment 4 shows, the opinion raster becomes dark society-wide quickly
and this pattern remains stable (the pattern converges within 580 time steps, including 20
consecutive time steps when no agent change its preference). The 50 percent of agents
favoring 1 or “Yes” in the beginning of the simulation apparently cannot persist against
influence of their discussants who consistently get “brain-washed” through selectively
reinterpreting or trusting what the medium suggests (0 or “No”) on the given issue. This
pattern further implies that the selective perception mechanism conducted by the
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audience can be an invisible helper for a regime to reshape public opinion in a short time.
Preference diversity or political disagreement in this homogeneous environment may
survive, but this will occur only if dissidents can meet and continue to interact with each
other.
This pattern of homogeneity can be changed in three possible situations. First, the
news medium itself starts to provide diverse perspectives on the given issue. Second, the
regime or the society opens the market to other news sources. These two situations will
transform the pattern of Experiment 4 to one that similar to the pattern of Experiment 2.
The third situation is that the audience of that society changes the way they
process the single news source. Given that everything is controlled, when individuals
start to ignore what they receive from the news source on the controversial issue (due to
either cynicism or distrust to the government), preference diversity survives and clusters
of the opposite preference emerge. The pattern of Experiment 5 can grow to one that is
similar to the patter of Experiment 3.
In sum, the series of simulation demonstrates that, first, the existence of monotone
medium matters in homogenizing a society when individuals consciously or
unconsciously selectively process the messages from the news source; the homogenizing
effect of communication network accelerate this process. Second, in a fragmented and
polarized news media environment, that some agents performing selective perception
does not help increase the level of perceived diversity; the proportion of agents
perceiving diversity within their communication networks will increase when agents are
less selective, if not completely ignorant about the news messages.
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Conclusion and Discussion
In the present study, we have shown how diverse news sources and the
mechanism of selective perception affect the survival of preference diversity. The results
indicate that the overall impact of the introduction of the news media is contingent on the
diversity of the messages offered by the media as well as the willingness of agents to
accept media messages at face value.
By design, political discussion within communication networks is a force to
homogenize individuals’ preferences. This pattern corresponds to the three robust
features of social self-organization: clustering, consolidation, and continuous diversity
(Latane & Nowak, 1997; Latane, et al., 1994). Moreover, the comparison across the
simulation results suggests that—given the availability of multiple news sources and an
assumption that individuals consistently access their favorite news s and sometime
perform selective perception of the news—preference diversity can survive in networks
composed of like-minded individuals. These findings are consistent with the view that
accessing the news media is a force of enhancing social heterogeneity (Gonzalez-Avella,
et al., 2006; Mutz & Martin, 2001; Shibanai, et al., 2001).
The findings of this paper advances what we have known by two points. First,
increasing probability of interacting with the news media may not necessarily lead to
preference diversity. We suggest that accessing the news media sustains preference
diversity is contingent upon whether individuals have freedom to access self-selected
news sources. Regarding the survival of preference diversity, there exists a discernible
difference between a society with multiple news sources and a society only having stateown news media (or a society with multiple news sources but all favoring one side of an
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issue). Second, selective perception of news media messages as a mechanism of
processing information plays a critical role in the survival of preference diversity.
Correspondent to an empirical finding that selectively accessing fragmented media
environment increases the likelihood that viewers strengthen their partisanship and
ideology (Jones, 2002), our finding further shows that, in a multiple-source news
environment the number of individuals who perceive preference diversity is likely to drop
if the assumption of selective perception holds. In a situation where all of the individuals
ignore what they receive from the news media or simply refuse to take these piece of
information seriously the number of individuals perceiving preference diversity is likely
to increase and the boundaries of opinion clusters is likely to become distinctive. This
implies that when individuals in a society become more selective in the source of news,
or even prone to reinterpret messages to support their existing (biased) beliefs, the society
might grow more polarized (as shown in the comparison between Experiment 2 and
Experiment 3 in Figure 2. This finding also implies that, if a society has grown polarized,
one way to mitigate it is to decrease opportunities that drive individuals to “bowling
along” (Putnam, 1995) and be selective about news information, such as providing public
forums for citizens to obtain broader perspectives about candidates or an issue (e.g.,
Fishkin, 1995).
In a society of monotone news source, the story is different. Selective perception
is likely to facilitate the homogenization of preference at the aggregate level. Indeed, the
homogenization of the public’s preference should not be simply attributed to this
selective perception mechanism; instead, we see it as a result of the synthesis of the three
forces—selective perception of the information 0 that makes half of the audience
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favoring 0 grow resistant to the influence from their network members favoring 1, the
homogenizing effects from self-selected like-minded network members that makes those
favoring 0 less likely to change, and the autoregressive influence of the communication
networks that make individuals favoring 1 conform to the majority (contrast Experiment
4 against Experiment 5 in Table 1).
Researchers concerning democratization across the world may associate this
pattern of Experiment 4 to non-democratic regimes where news sources are controlled by
the government or a political party. This pattern can also be associated to a democracy
where the news media stand together to broadcast a certain preference. We predict that a
pattern of Experiment 4 (see Figure 2) can be transformed to a situation like the pattern of
Experiment 2, when alternative news source becomes available, or to the pattern like
Experiment 3, when citizens, particularly those favoring 0, turn to ignore the source, or
even distrust or reject the biased source of political education. For example, the pattern of
Experiment 4 may be similar to the homogeneous communist society in Poland before
1989. Poland is one of new democracies whose democratization was triggered by media
liberalization. The emergence of a diverse media free of direct political interference is
both a cause and a characteristic of the democratization process (Millard, 1998). From
our perspective, the growing diversity in citizens’ preference about whether or not
adopting democracy underlies such democratic transition. Latent disagreement about the
government can grow dramatically when individuals become less willing to trust the
global news source.
Indeed, ABM is more like a “thought experiment” (Axelrod, 1997) than an
approach to predict the future. This does not say, however, that results derived from
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ABM should not be bridged to empirical approaches. Instead, this paper welcomes
inspection of the implications with case studies and empirical examinations about the
suggested relationships. For example, the visualized patterns of Experiments 2 and 3 in
Figure 2 suggest that individuals residing within a boundary of an opinion cluster in
Experiment 3 are more likely to perceive a greater level of homogeneity or agreement
than those in Experiment 2. Efforts to validate heuristics drawn from such social
simulations will help the construction of external validity of the model.
Future research applying ABM in general or our model in particular, to the study
of political communication needs to address the following three issues. First, there is
much room to fine-tune our model to study public opinion. In the present project, we
assume a low and fixed proportion of elites (i.e. the politically aware agents). Although a
study about the influence of varying the number of elites is beyond the scope of this
paper, we look forward seeing more applications of ABM (e.g., Bowden & McDonald,
2006) to the study of the influence of the increase or decrease of such elite agents on the
dynamics of opinion formation. Moreover, as the picture provided by Experiment 2
resembles most modern democratic regimes that preserve highest level of preference
diversity, we suggest future studies tune the role of news media and communication
networks and see how such changes in context affect the characteristics of opinion
formation.
Second, technically one should consider add complexity to the model. Agents of
the model in this paper are diversified by 6x2 dimensions (six variables—memory
capacity and propensity to discuss politics, to access the media, and to perform selective
perception—and two classes—the politically aware and the politically unaware). Future
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studies extending this project may consider adding variance to the following elements or
parameter values of the model to answer specified questions: the diversity of the
propensity to conform to the majority , the scope of media influence (Gonzalez-Avella, et
al., 2006), the size of networks, the strength of news media influence, the number of
issues considered, the strength of the news media, the mechanism of selective perception
on messages from network members (Galam, 2005b), the difference between political
experts and general voters regarding various degrees of selective perception (see also,
Fiorina, et al., 2005), and a new class of agents representing “independent voters”.
Adding complexity to the model may not change the fundamental patterns found with a
concise model; doing so increases the internal validity of the original model design. If a
newly introduced parameter or an alternative assumption is found to change a pattern
found in the literature, however, the new parameter or the new assumption will in turn
contribute to model design and theory development (e.g., Huckfeldt, et al., 2004).
Finally, cross-disciplinary study about information processing, social cognition
and political communication are expected to advance the development and application of
the present research. Researchers will need to catch up with the development of selective
perception theory and empirical findings about voting behavior, such as if (and how)
accessing the media is correlated with discussing politics and how individuals conform to
or resist against the influence of the majority. Our conclusions are derived directly from
our model design, which is based on a number of assumptions that worth examination in
cross-disciplinary studies, such as
•

Individuals’ communication networks are composed of a limited number of selfselected members;
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•

Individuals tend to seek like-minded political experts as major political
discussants;

•

Individuals selectively choose their political information sources;

•

Individuals have limited and fixed capacity to store information;

•

The level of individuals’ political knowledge or expertise remain stable over time;

•

While discussing politics, individuals differentiate the implicit message held by
their discussants, make simplistic judgments about the other’s positions, and add
that impression to its existing evaluation of an issue (a receive-accept-sample
process);

•

The politically aware individuals are more efficient and selective than their
politically less aware counterparts in the process of seeking and processing
political information;

•

The politically aware individuals account for a small portion of the public;

•

The choice of news media reflects an individual’s partisan orientation.

Whenever these assumptions are modified or advanced, we will need to update
corresponding the model design and check if previous patterns still hold. This task leaves
a great level of uncertainty to ABM modelers, but we think is where physics,
communication scholars, social psychologists, computer scientists, and political scientists
contribute a better understanding of human complex system.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics of the 100 Runs of Simulation for Each Experiment
Parameters
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
Number of News Source
0
2
2
1
Agents Performing Selective
Yes
No
Yes
Perception
Mean Mean Mean
Mean
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.)
Preference “Yes”
.507
.501
.501
.007
(.051) (.052) (.036) (.004)
Preference Diversity
.214
.232
.229
.009
(.015) (.014) (.012) (.005)

Exp. 5
1
No
Mean
(S.D.)
.501
(.055)
.232
(.013)
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Figure Captions

Figure 1. The Flow Chart of Agent Information Processing
Figure 2. Patterns of Preference Diversity
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Figure 1. The Flow Chart of Agent Information Processing
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Source: Liu, F. C. S. (2010). Polarized news media and the polarization of the
electorate. International Journal of Artificial Life Research, 1(1), p. 39.
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Figure 2. Patterns of Preference Diversity
Initial Condition

Experiment 2

Experiment 4

Experiment 1

Experiment 3

Experiment 5

Note: The snapshots were taken at the 900th time step (update).
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